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CASE BRIEF
LORNSON v. SIDDIQUI
Pablo A. Godoy
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a recent decision, established a
claimant's cause of action in a wrongful death medical malpractice suit
does not (1) survive the death of the claimant; and (2) that adult
children of the deceased are not eligible claimants in a wrongful death
suit.1 The Court's decision effectively put an end to the inconsistent
application of Chapter 655 of the Wisconsin Statute, which established
an exclusive procedure for the prosecution of medical malpractice
claims against a health care provider.2 Prior to this decision, courts
struggled to determine whether the lack of statutory provisions in
Chapter 655 enabled or precluded the application of statutory
provisions not referenced in the statute.
3
I. LORNSON LITIGATION HISTORY
Joseph Sanders filed a wrongful death claim against the
defendants for medical negligence in the death of his wife, Janice.4
Sanders filed the complaint on behalf of himself individually and as
special administrator of his wife's estate. 5 After initial discovery but
before trial, Sanders died.6 Plaintiffs Lornson and Hoertsch, Sanders'
adult daughters, sought compensatory damages under three theories of
recovery: (1) on behalf of the estate of Janice Sanders in their capacity
as special administrators; (2) on behalf of the estate of John Sanders in
their capacity as personal representatives, citing Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2);
and (3) in the alternative of the second theory, citing Wis. Stat. §
895.04(2), on behalf of themselves in their individual capacities as the
surviving daughters and lineal heirs of Janice Sanders.
7
lLornson v. Siddiqui, 735 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 2007)
2 See Wisc. Stat. ch. 655.
3 See Dziadosz v. Zirneski, 501 N.W.2d 828 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); Storm v. Legion
Ins. Co., 665 N.W.2d 353 (Wis. 1995)
4 Lornson, 735 N.W.2d at 3.5 id.
6 Id. at 8.
7 Id. at 10.
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All defendants joined in a motion to dismiss the wrongful death
claim asserted on behalf of Joseph Sanders' estate and the claim
asserted on behalf of Lomson and Hoertsch individually. The
defendants asserted both plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a wrongful
death claim in the capaci of personal representatives of their father's
estate or as individuals. However, the defendants conceded the
survival claim by the special administrators on behalf of Janice
Sanders' estate was unaffected by Joseph Sanders' death.
The Winnebago Circuit Court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the wrongful death claims, reasoning that Wis. Stat. § 655.007
provided the exclusive list of claimants eligible to bring a medical
malpractice action.9 The court concluded that the exclusion of adult
children or a spouse's representative in § 655.007, indicated that the
legislature did not intend for adult children or the spouse's
representative to bring a wrongful death claim. The court of appeals
certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to address the issue
of whether "a surviving spouse's wrongful death claim in a medical
malpractice action survive[s] his or her own death such that his or her
personal representatives have standing to pursue that claim." 10 After
accepting certification, the Supreme Court addressed the individual
wrongful death claims that were a result of medical malpractice of adult
children.
II. DISCUSSION
In determining whether the adult children of a deceased parent
or the personal representatives of a surviving but now deceased spouse
are eligible to bring a medical malpractice wrongful death claim, the
court began its analysis by looking to the language of the relevant and
related statutes, followed by examining case law, legislative history and
legislative intent.
Sld.
9 Id. 12.
0 Id.
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A. Standing of Adult Children of Deceased Parent
to Bring Forth a Medical Malpractice Wrongful Death Claim
The court began its analysis with provisions of Chapter 655 of
the Wisconsin Statutes. Wis. Stat. § 655.006, provides in part that "On
and after July 24, 1975, every patient, every patients representative and
every health care provider shall be conclusively presumed to have
accepted to be bound by this chapter.""II Wis. Stat. § 655.007, which
enumerates the eligible claimants of a medical malpractice claim,
provides "Patients' Claims. On and after July 24, 1974, any patient or
the patient's representative having a claim or any spouse, parent, minor
sibling or child of the patient having a derivative claim for injury or
death on account of malpractice is subject to this chapter."' 12
No dispute existed between the parties that Lomson and
Hoertsch had a direct claim as successor special administrators of their
mother's estate. The issue faced by the court was whether Lornson and
Hoertsch had a derivative claim under Wis. Stat. § 655.007 for their
mother's death given the absence of language indicating the phrase
"child of the patient" included adult children.
Relying on the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 and
its previous interpretation in Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp. 3 , the court
held only minor children and minor siblings, in addition to the spouse
and parents of the patient, have derivative claims under Wis. Stat. §
655.007. Thus, Lornson and Hoertsch's individual claims failed.
B. Standing of Personal Representatives to Bring Forth a
Medical Malpractice Wrongful Death Claim of a Surviving But
Now Deceased Spouse
The other issue confronted by the court is whether the original
claimant's derivative wrongful death claim, as the spouse of the
deceased, survives the claimant's death, if death occurs before a
judgment has been rendered. Given that Wis. Stat. § 895.01 is a
separate statute on what actions survive the death of a claimant, the
court had to determine whether the language and history of Chapter 655
" See Wis. STAT. § 655.006 (1)(a) (2006).
12 See Wis. STAT. § 655.007.
13 See Czapinski v. St. Francis Hosp., 613 N.W.2d 120 (Wis. 2000).
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limited potential claimants to those enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 655.007
or whether the list of claimants may also include potential claimants
allowed under the wrongful death statute within Chapter 895.14
The court looked to legislative intent as a result of what it
perceived to be ambiguousness within the various statutes. While Wis.
Stat. § 655.007 clearly permits a spouse to bring a wrongful death
claim, the chapter is silent as to what happens in the event the spouse
dies before judgment.15 As a result of this silence, the court referred to
the general wrongful death provision in Chapter 895 to determine the
survivability of a spouse's claim, and relied exclusively on statutory
provisions rather than common law.
The general wrongful death provision may be found in Wis.
Stat. § 895.01(1) and when read along with paragraph (o), which
addresses the survival of a wrongful death claim, provides:
(1) In addition to the causes of action that survive at
common law, all of the following also survive:
(o) Causes of action for wrongful death, which
shall survive the death the wrongdoer whether
or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred
before or after the death of the injured person. 16
In its analysis and final determination that medical malpractice
wrongful death claims do not survive the death of the claimant, the
court looked to the additional language found only in paragraph (o).
This language made mention of the "death of the wrongdoer" while
making no such mention of the claimant's death. The court noted the
legislature intentionally made paragraph (o) inconsistent with the other
paragraphs in the survival statute by making a distinction between the
wrongdoer and the claimant through the use of restrictive language
exclusive to paragraph (0).17
In further examination, the court noted paragraph (o) had more
than one possible interpretation based on its language and when read in
conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), both provisions were in direct
14 See Wis. STAT. §§ 895.01 (1)(o) and 895.04 (2) (2006).
's See Wis. STAT. ch. 895 (2006).
16 See Wis. STAT. § 895.01(1)(o).
17 See Wis. STAT. § 895.01.
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conflict with each other. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) provides a
hierarchy of eligible claimants in a general wrongful death action. The
statute provides "if any such relative dies before judgment in action, the
relative next in order shall be entitled to recover for the wrongful
death."' 18  Therefore, an interpretation that a wrongful death claim
survived the death of the claimant would render the provision
meaningless because a cause of action would be assumed by the
claimant's personal representative rather than pass to the next relative
in line. The conflicting provisions of the statute and the resulting
ambiguousness required the court to examine the legislative history of
both provisions to determine their meaning.
After examining the legislative history and case law including
the 1999 amendment to the survival statute in Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1),
the court found the legislature had historically used the wrongful death
statute19 to define the eligibility and priority of claimants. Therefore,
the court held a claimant's personal claim does not survive his death;
rather it is succeeded by a new claim for someone lower in the
hierarchy.
In holding that the 1999 amendment was not intended to make
any substantive changes to the statute, the court relied on five pieces of
evidence in arriving at this conclusion. The court held the amendment
was intended merely to reorganize the statute based on: (1) the
amendment as a Revisor's Correction Bill, which rarely makes
substantive changes to laws;20 (2) the use of descriptive language in
the "relating clause" within the 1999 Wis. Act 85, which mirrors the
Revisor's duties in Wis. Stat. § 13.93; 2 1 (3) the legislative note to the
revision of Wis. Stat. § 895.01 ;22 (4) the length of the assembly bill that
promulgated 1999 Wis. Act 85 and the lack of amendments to it 23; and
(5) the fact that the assembly bill has no amendment or cross-reference
to Wis. Stat. § 865.04(2) 24.
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the survival rule
should be applied more expansively to medical malpractice wrongful
death claims because the court had never held the succession rule of
18 See Wis. STAT. § 895.04(2).
19 See WIS. STAT. § 895.04.
20 See Wis. STAT. § 13.93(3)0) (2006).
21 See 1999 Wis. Act 85, available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/1999/data/acts/99
Act85.pdf.
22 See Note, 1999 Wis. Act 85, § 171.
23 See 1999 A.B. 925.
24 Id.
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Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) did not apply to medical malpractice actions.
Here, the court held the case law did not support this argument 25 and
such a ruling would conflict, not complement, the statutory provisions
of Chapter 655. This effectively ended any claim Lomson and
Hoertsch had as representative's of their father's estate for damages
because the original claim did not survive their father's death.
C. Constitutional Claims: Deprivation of Property
without Due Process and Deprivation of Equal Protection
Under the Law
Lornson and Hoertsch asserted that an interpretation of Wis.
Stat. § 655.007 which denies their claims as personal representatives of
Joseph Sanders' estate cannot stand on constitutional grounds.
The court quickly disposed of the argument that Joseph
Sanders' statutory right to recover damages for the death of his wife
became a vested property right, and as a result, denial of their claim
deprives his estate of a vested property interest without due process.
The court held Joseph Sanders did not acquire a vested property right in
a wrongful death cause of action because a cause of action for wrongful
death is purely statutory.
Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that Joseph
Sanders and his estate were deprived of equal protection of the law.
The court reasoned that unless a statute impinges on a fundamental
right, it need only meet a rational basis of review. The court continued
that since Wis. Stat. § 655.007 is not based on a fundamental right and
a rational basis exists for the distinction between claimants who die
before judgment and those who do not, the equal protection clause was
not violated. In addition, the court held its interpretation of Wis. Stat. §
655.007 in conjunction with §§ 895.01(l)(o) and 895.04)(2) has an
equal effect on all claimants, and thus, does not violate the equal
protection clause.
25 See Schmidt v. Menasha Woodenware Co., 74 N.W. 797 (Wis. 1898).
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III. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision served to clarify
conflicting statutory provisions related to medical malpractice wrongful
death claims. In doing so, the court placed a limitation on who is
eligible to file a claim following the death of the original claimant in a
cause of action.
Under the courts ruling, an eligible claimant's cause of action
does not survive the death of the claimant in wrongful death actions.
However, in non-medical malpractice wrongful death claims under
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), a new cause of action is available to the next
claimant in the statutory hierarchy. In medical malpractice wrongful
death cases, in contrast, eligible claimants under Wis. Stat. § 655.007
are not subject to the statutory hierarchy like claimants under Wis. Stat.
§ 895.04(2), but the exclusivity of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 precludes adult
children of the deceased, in addition to all other individuals not listed as
eligible claimants under the statute, from filing a claim.
The court's decision in this matter leaves an improbable
possibility of further litigation on constitutional grounds, but more
importantly, the decision seems to undermine the purpose of legislation
that ensures the quality of health care for individuals through tort action
for meritorious malpractice claims. The court's ruling detracts from the
deterrent effect legislation such as Wis. Stat. § 655.007 could have in
preventing careless medical practices by severely limiting the scope of
whom an eligible claimant is following the death of the original
claimant before a judgment is rendered. Thus, the court shielded the
negligent party(s) from taking responsibility for not fulfilling the duties
owed to their patients or clients. The language of Wis. Stat. §
895.01(l)(o) is unambiguous and based on a plain reading of the
statute, permits all claims of action for wrongful death to survive the
death of the claimant.26  While the court held that Wis. Stat. §
895.01(1)(o) and Wis. Stat. § 655.007 conflicted, it is arguable that a
ruling in favor of permitting the survival of a cause of action following
the death of a claimant in a medical malpractice wrongful death claim
would complement and further the purpose of wrongful death
legislation.
26 See Lornson, 735 N.W.2d at 82 (Crooks, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
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